SEESAC

RMDS/G 05.30

4th Edition
2006-07-20

Weapons storage and security

Head,
SEESAC,
UNDP Belgrade,
Internacionalnih Brigada 56,
11000 Belgrade,
Serbia

E-mail: rmds@undp.org.yu
Telephone: (+381) (11) 344 63 53
Fax: (+381) (11) 344 63 56

Warning

This document is current with effect from the date shown on the cover page. As the Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards/Guidelines (RMDS/G) are subject to regular review and revision, users should regularly consult the RMDS/G project website in order to verify their current status: www.seesac.org

Copyright notice

This document is a South Eastern and Eastern Europe Regional Micro-Disarmament Standard/Guideline (RMDS/G) and is copyright protected by UNDP. Neither this document, nor any extract from it, may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, for any other purpose without prior written permission from SEESAC, acting on behalf of UNDP.

This document is not to be sold.

Head,
SEESAC,
UNDP Belgrade,
Internacionalnih Brigada 56
11000 Belgrade,
Serbia

E-mail: rmds@undp.org.yu
Telephone: (+381) (11) 344 6353
Fax: (+381) (11) 344 6356

© SEESAC 2006 – All rights reserved

Contents

Contents ii
Foreword iii
Introduction iv
Weapons storage and security 1
1 Scope 1
2 References 1
3 Terms and definitions 1
4 Establishing a national SALW stockpile database 1
5 Stockpile locations 2
5.1 Stockpile risk assessment 2
5.2 Stockpile location parameters 2
5.3 Secure facilities 2
5.3.1 Standard laws and regulations 3
5.3.2 Additional regulations regarding stockpile management 3
5.4 Physical security 3
5.4.1 Staff selection and security systems 3
5.4.2 Perimeter illumination 4
5.4.3 Fencing 4
5.4.4 Patrols 4
5.4.5 Access controls 4
5.4.6 Reporting of SALW losses 4
6 Inventory management and accounting control measures 4
7 Transport security 5
7.1 Regulations 5
7.2 Documentation 5
7.3 Emergency Procedures 5
7.4 Land transport 5
7.5 Air Transport 5
7.6 Sea Transport 6
7.7 Additional Measures 6
8 Areas of responsibility 6
8.1 National SALW authority 6
8.2 SALW Control organisation 6
8.3 Regional organizations 7
8.4 SEESAC 7
Annex A (Informative) References 8
Annex B (Informative) Terms and definitions 9

Foreword

On 08 May 2003 the development of regional micro-disarmament[1] standards and guidelines was discussed during the RACVIAC sponsored seminar on '***SALW - A year after Implementation of the Stability Pact Plan*** '. The consensus was that such standards and guidelines were desirable, and SEESAC agreed to develop a framework and then take responsibility for the future development of regional standards. It was agreed RMDS/G would be designed to support the work at the operational level, and would go further than the more generic 'best practice' documents currently available. After a wide-ranging discussion between stakeholders as to the status of RMDS/G it has been agreed that the term 'standards' will refer to the technical issues, whilst 'guidelines' will apply to 'programme' issues.

This RMDS/G [2] reflects the development of operational procedures, practices and norms, which have occurred over the past four years in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)[3] control. Best operational practices have been identified and reviewed from within the region and beyond, and included as appropriate within this RMDS/G.

SEESAC has a mandate under the Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan to fulfil, among others, operational objectives of 1) sharing information on and enhancing co-operation in the establishment and implementation of SALW control and reduction programmes and approaches among regional actors; and 2) providing linkage and co-ordination with the other relevant regional initiatives. The development of RMDS/G is one means of fulfilling that mandate.

The work of preparing, reviewing and revising these standards and guidelines is conducted by SEESAC, with the support of international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and consultants. The latest version of each standard, together with background information on the development work, can be found at www.seesac.org. RMDS/G will be reviewed at least every three years to reflect developing SALW control norms and practices, and to incorporate changes to international regulations and requirements. The latest review was conducted on 01 March 2006, which has reflected the development of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) www.unddr.org, which include RMDS/G as a normative reference in the Disarmament and the SALW Control modules.

[1] Defined as: 'The monitoring, collection, control and final disposal of small arms, related ammunition and explosives and light weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible weapons and ammunition management programmes'. Often used interchangeably with SALW control in the past, but SALW Control is now the recognised terminology. The term Micro-Disarmament has only been used here to ensure consistency of the RMDS/G concept, rather than renaming the standards.

[2] The layout and format of RMDS/G are based on the highly successful International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The cooperation of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is acknowledged by SEESAC during the development of RMDS/G.

[3] There is no agreed international definition of SALW. For the purposes of RMDS/G the following definition will apply: '***All lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability***'

Introduction

Effective and appropriate control of SALW and stockpiles is an essential element of any national SALW control programme. The logical and systematic control of SALW stockpiles is in keeping with the philosophy of 'due care' and therefore nations must take a pro-active, rather than re-active stance in ensuring that are weapons and are secured to the utmost standards. By doing so, military and police forces will not only increase national and regional security, but will achieve added credibility with the international community and those that they are sworn to protect.

This document is to be taken as a guideline for practical SALW security in order to achieve the above stated goals and will provide the user with sensible measures that will help to prevent leakages of SALW stocks. These measures are reasonable, cost effective and will enhance any national programme of weapons stockpile management.

Weapons storage and security

1 Scope

This RMDS/G establishes the guiding principles and technical methodology for weapons storage and security as part of a comprehensive national SALW control program.

2 References

A list of normative references is given in Annex A. Normative references are important documents to which reference is made in this standard, and which form part of the provisions of this standard.

3 Terms and definitions

A list of terms and definitions used in this standard is given in Annex B. A complete glossary of all the terms and definitions used in the RMDS/G series is given in RMDS/G 02.10.

In the RMDS/G series, the words 'shall', 'should' and 'may' are used to indicate the intended degree of compliance. This use is consistent with the language used in ISO standards and guidelines.

a) 'shall' is used to indicate requirements, methods or specifications which are to be adopted in order to satisfy the standard in full.

b) 'should' is used to indicate the preferred requirements, methods or specifications.

c) 'may' is used to indicate a possible method or course of action.

The term 'national authority' refers to the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in each SALW country charged with the regulation, management and co-ordination of SALW activities.

4 Establishing a national SALW stockpile database

In order to achieve a holistic and effective programme of SALW stockpile management, national authorities must first determine:

a) the number of SALW being held by both the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI);

b) the make, model and serial numbers of SALW;

c) the physical location of SALW stockpiles;

d) the condition of SALW stockpiles; and

e) the SALW designation (operational, reserve or surplus).

The above information should be entered into a computerised national database, which should be collated and controlled by an established national authority. This will allow national authorities to record:

a) SALW locations;

b) SALW supplies;

c) SALW movements; and

d) intentions for future use.

This forms the basis for an effective SALW stockpile management system in that one centralised database collects and collates all SALW information, thus allowing the responsible authority to make timely and rational decisions based upon confirmed information.

5 Stockpile locations

5.1 Stockpile risk assessment

Once SALW stockpiles are located, identified and collated into a national database, attention must be given to the physical locations where the SALW are stored. A risk assessment should be commissioned to determine:

a) the physical threat of the SALW to the local population;

b) the financial value of the facility and contents within;

c) active dangers and frequency of active dangers: The probability of stockpile leakages through espionage, theft, burglary or terrorist attack;

d) passive dangers and frequency of passive dangers: Natural catastrophes such as floods, earthquakes, fires etc;

e) attractiveness: Indicators, based upon the content of a given facility, to be susceptible to direct or surreptitious attack; and

f) vulnerability to attack.

This information, when used properly, will allow the responsible authority to establish management priorities in the most cost-effective and secure manner. Residual risk is kept to a minimum.

5.2 Stockpile location parameters

Stockpile locations will vary depending upon national policy and those forces that intend to use them. Inevitably, those weapons deemed needed for national police or military forces will be located locally, while those designated for reserve forces will be maintained centrally. In either event, a security survey of these facilities should be conducted. The location of storage facilities should be determined by:

a) a stockpile risk assessment as stipulated in clause 5.1 above;

b) requirements for access and intervention time;

c) temperature and humidity;

d) local environment;

e) local infrastructure; and

f) the requirement for security personnel.

5.3 Secure facilities

SALW storage facilities should be a secure site within a secured facility such as a military base or police station. The existence of these stockpiles should be made known to the site commander and to other relevant members of the securing organisation. The building in which SALW are stored should, at a minimum, be a reinforced Type 1.1 structure [4], with steel plated doors with security frames, steel window barriers and high level security locks and hasps.

[4] 1st PfP Swiss Training Course on Stockpile Management and Security of SALW, 27 May - 01 June 2001.

5.3.1 Standard laws and regulations [5]

The stockpile location should operate within all appropriate national laws and regulations governing the storage of SALW, as well as those covering security and health and safety.

5.3.2 Additional regulations regarding stockpile management [6]

A stockpile location should have its own set of specific regulations; 1) covering relevant local security issues; 2) for ease of reference; and 3) to facilitate quick reaction in the event of an emergency.

Regulations for a stockpile location should:

a) outline the scope of the instructions;

b) detail who is the officer in charge of the location (name, location and telephone number at minimum);

c) outline any security threats;

d) detail all those at the location with security responsibilities (security officers, safety officers, armaments officers, transport officers, stores officers, accounting officers etc); and

e) outline security procedures to be followed in different areas of the establishment (storage, servicing, emergency situations, etc).

5.4 Physical security

5.4.1 Staff selection and security systems

It is a given fact that no secured facility is impervious to a determined attack. However, it is the duty of those tasked to secure SALW stockpiles, to thwart, deter or delay the time necessary for the illegal removal of SALW from their storage areas. Application of a stockpile risk assessment as stipulated in clause 5.1 above will give those responsible for securing SALW stocks an indicator as to the level of security needed to achieve their tasks. Physical security as a minimum should consist of:

a) highly trained security staff; and

b) active and passive security systems.

Certified guard dogs and handlers can and should be considered as they have proven to be a significant deterrent to theft.

A background security check should be made of all personnel that have physical access to SALW stockpiles and should hold and maintain a *confidential security clearance* as a minimum. Security checks of these persons should be reviewed bi-annually.

All active and passive security devices should meet international standards and should be tested daily for system continuity, and tested annually by trained and certified technicians. Active security devices should be positioned on key entry points such as doors and windows. Motion detectors should be positioned in interior rooms so that they cover a 360degree radius of the interior of the storage area.

[5] OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security, 2003

[6] Ibid

5.4.2 Perimeter illumination

All secure SALW facilities should have enough illumination for guard forces to be able to scan the entire perimeter of the site. All access points to a storage area should have direct illumination above all entry points. The illumination control system should be accessible only to the commander of the guard team. All lighting systems for the perimeter of the facility should radiate slightly outwards in order to facilitate night vision of the guard force and restricting that of those looking into the inner perimeter.

5.4.3 Fencing

All SALW storage facilities should, at a minimum, be fenced with chain-link fencing topped with concertina wire, with a minimum number of entry points. Cleared areas around the interior and exterior of the fence should be maintained so that intruder detection is easily discernable.

5.4.4 Patrols

Guard patrols should be made at regular intervals, but in addition, random checks must be made. Physical security checks of access points should be made and logged during patrols.

5.4.5 Access controls

Physical entry to SALW storage facilities should be limited to those that must enter to perform their official duties. Key control to these storage areas must be strict and the number of keys should be kept to a minimum. Access control logs must be kept and periodically verified by site commanders. These access control logs should be maintained for a period of one year. An inventory of keys should be made and logged during every shift change.

5.4.6 Reporting of SALW losses

Any observed loss of SALW stock must be reported immediately to the site commander, who will take immediate and appropriate reporting actions. Reports should include [7]:

a) identification of the specific stockpile location and/or the storage sites (if the report is communicated externally) and of the individual reporting the loss;

b) item identification, quantity, serial numbers and other identifying marks;

c) date, time and place of loss/recovery and outline of circumstances of loss or recovery;

d) actions taken: who is investigating the loss; who has been informed; any action being taken to prevent any further loss.

6 Inventory management and accounting control measures

Effective inventory accounting measures must be established in order to ensure that any stock leakages are identified as quickly as possible. The inventory accounting system should be computerised if possible, but whether the accounting system is computerised or on paper, backup copies of the inventory should be made and stored at a separate secure location. These records should be maintained indefinitely and audited at regular intervals. These audits should be conducted with physical cross-checks of the actual SALW stocks.

[7] Ibid

7 Transport security [8]

The transport of SALW requires specific security and safety measures. Transport regulations and security are imperative in order to prevent loss and theft of SALW as well as to prevent abuse and illicit trafficking. Strategies for clandestine transports are part of such standards.

7.1 Regulations

National civilian legislation and military regulations are an essential basis for the standardization of transport security. These should be combined with international agreements such as the *European Agreement on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road* or the *International Ordinance on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail, (Appendix I to the International Agreement on Rail Freight Transport)*'. It should be noted that SALW in themselves are not 'dangerous goods' in this respect. Transportation should be planned and conducted as is customary for other precious items (e.g. currency, gold, diamonds, etc). It is when SALW are transported with related ammunition that they should considered 'dangerous goods'. Effective regulation for cargo verification and inspection mechanism can help prevent illicit transfers of SALW that are facilitated by falsified transport documentation.

7.2 Documentation

Each transport movement of SALW should be accompanied by cargo documentation/freight papers. Hand-over/take-over protocols requiring signatures upon receipt should also be in place.

7.3 Emergency Procedures

As a rule, SALW and related ammunition should be transported in separate vehicles. Only in exceptional circumstances should they be transported together. In the case of an accident, standardized contingency plans should be at hand that includes; 1) directives for traffic and safety regulation; 2) instructions for medical care; 3) notification procedures in order to contact the authorities in charge; 4) access to weapons and ammunition specialists; and 5) medical and fire prevention personnel.

7.4 Land transport

Land transport may be conducted by marked or unmarked military vehicles, (sometimes even armoured vehicles), civilian transport, or secured and sealed railway wagons or containers. If civilian contractors are used to move SALW by land, then procedures for authorization, security, monitoring and inspection of both the movements and the contractors themselves should be in place beforehand. They should be equipped with specific protection measures, (e.g. alarm systems on vehicles or electronic tracers in boxes), monitored by the police, or guarded by military or security forces, depending on the quantity of SALW transported and the respective risk assessment. Transport routes should generally be planned in advance and information concerning these routes should be treated as classified.

7.5 Air Transport

Military air transport movements should follow military regulations and procedures. Air transport can be conducted by transport agents. These are individuals or organizations, such as cargo companies or air freight agencies, who assume primary responsibility for facilitating, managing or organizing the transport of the stocks of SALW from the point of dispatch to their final destination. They may use leased or chartered freighter aircraft with hired aircrews. Such agents should purchase or otherwise obtain the necessary over-flight authorization for the countries through which the goods will be transported. Detailed flight and routing plans should be charted and overseen to ensure adherence.

[8] Ibid

7.6 Sea Transport

SALW shipments by sea should be conducted in locked/sealed containers by cargo companies or agencies on leased or chartered ships with hired crews. Shipments should be inspected in transit and checked upon receipt by the receiving authority to ensure that seals are intact. The shipments should be checked for any other signs of theft or loss.

7.7 Additional Measures

The following additional measures should be implemented:

a) the SALW should be rendered inoperable and functional parts should be stored separately;

b) procedures and arrangements for regular traffic between the same two locations should be varied and reviewed regularly;

c) containers should be placed side-by-side, and use should be made of the barriers of rail doors;

d) SALW should be placed in the rear of containers;

e) special training for drivers and accompanying personnel should be provided; and

f) all transport should be equipped with communication systems.

8 Areas of responsibility

8.1 National SALW authority [9]

The national SALW authority shall develop documented procedures for the storage, transportation and handling of weapons, which include:

a) standards for the storage of weapons, including storage on SALW collection sites; and

b) standards for the carriage of weapons, including warning signs and symbols to be used on vehicles.

8.2 SALW Control organisation

The SALW Control organisation shall establish and maintain SOPs that comply with the provisions of this RMDS/G, established international standards, the national SALW authority standards and other relevant standards or regulations.

In the absence of a national SALW authority or authorities, the SALW Control organisation should assume additional responsibilities. These include, but are not restricted to:

g) issue, maintain and update their own regulations, codes of practice, SOPs and other suitable provisions on the storage, transportation and handling of weapons;

h) co-operate with other employees in the same country to ensure consistency of standards for the storage, transportation and handling of weapons; and

i) assist in framing national regulations and codes of practice for the storage, transportation and handling of weapons.

[9] In this case the national SALW authority, if the same as the national SALW commission, may be responsible to itself.

8.3 Regional organizations

In certain areas of the world, regional organizations have been given a mandate by their member states to coordinate and support SALW control programmes within a state national boundaries. (For example EUFOR within Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In these circumstances the regional organization should assume many of the responsibilities and roles of the national SALW authority, and could also act as a conduit for donor resources. The responsibilities and roles of regional organizations for SALW control will vary from state to state and may be subject to specific Memoranda of Understanding, or similar agreements.

8.4 SEESAC

SEESAC shall provide operational assistance, technical assistance and management information, within resources and on request, to all SALW intervention programmes within South Eastern and Eastern Europe, and assistance to SALW intervention programmes worldwide through the drafting and issuing of RMDS/G.

Annex A
(Informative)
References

The following informative documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this part of the standard. For dated references, subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this part of the standard are encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent editions of the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest edition of the informative document referred to applies. Members of ISO and IEC maintain registers of currently valid ISO or EN:

a) OSCE Best Practice Guide on National Procedures for Stockpile Management and Security;

b) European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR);

c) International Ordinance on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail, (Appendix I to the International Agreement on Rail Freight Transport); and

d) United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Model Regulations (Eleventh revised edition).

The latest version/edition of these references should be used. SEESAC hold copies of all references used in this standard. A register of the latest version/edition of the RMDS/G standards, guides and references is maintained by SEESAC, and can be read on the RMDS/G website: http://www.seesac.org/. National SALW authorities, employers and other interested bodies and organisations should obtain copies before commencing SALW programmes.

Annex B
(Informative)
Terms and definitions

B.1.1
arms control
the imposition of restrictions of the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce a restriction.

B.1.2
arms exports
the trade in weapons, guns and ammunition, usually international and often closely monitored and controlled by governments.

B.1.3
firearm
a barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet or other projectile can be discharged and that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death to a person, and includes any frame or receiver of such a barrelled weapon and anything that can be adapted for use as a firearm.[10]

B.1.4
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.5
harmful event
occurrence in which a **hazardous situation** results in harm. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)].

B.1.6
hazard
potential source of **harm.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.7
hazardous situation
circumstance in which people, property or the environment are exposed to one or more **hazards**. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)].

B.1.8
magazine
any building, structure or container approved for the storage of explosive materials.

B.1.9
micro-disarmament
the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible weapons and ammunition management programmes.

B.1.10
micro-disarmament organisation
refers to any organisation (government, military or commercial entity) responsible for implementing SALW Control projects or tasks. The organisation may be a prime contractor, subcontractor, consultant or agent.

[10] Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 'Interpretation' Paragraph 2.

B.1.11
MOD
(Ministry of Defence)

B.1.12
national authority
in the context of SALW, the term refers to.. the government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in a country charged with the regulation, management and coordination of **SALW** activities.

B.1.13
residual risk
in the context of SALW control, the term refers to….. the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove the risks inherent in all collection and destruction activities, and SALW stockpile management. [Modified from ISO Guide 51:1999]

B.1.14
risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of **harm** and the severity of that **harm.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.15
risk analysis
systematic use of available information to identify **hazards** and to estimate the **risk.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.16
risk assessment
overall process comprising a **risk analysis** and a **risk evaluation.** [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.17
risk evaluation
process based on **risk analysis** to determine whether the **tolerable risk** has been achieved [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.18
risk management
the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards the effective management of potential opportunities and threats.

B.1.19
risk reduction
actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular event or series of events.

B.1.20
safe
the absence of risk. Normally the term **tolerable risk** is more appropriate and accurate.

B.1.21
safety
the reduction of risk to a tolerable level [ISO Guide 51:1999(E)]

degree of freedom from unacceptable **risk**. [ISO Guide 51: 1999(E)]

B.1.22
security
an individual or states feeling of safety or well-being, protected from attack or violent conflict.

the control of threat, integrated with an appropriate response capability.

B.1.23
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
all lethal conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability.

Note: There are a variety of definitions for SALW circulating and international consensus on a 'correct' definition has yet to be agreed. For the purposes of RMDS/G the above definition will be used.

B.1.24
standard
a standard is a documented agreement containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.

Note: RMDS/G aim to improve safety and efficiency in SALW Control by promoting the preferred procedures and practices at both headquarters and field level. To be effective, the standards should be definable, measurable, achievable and verifiable.

B.1.25
standing operating procedures (SOPs)
standard operating procedures

instructions that define the preferred or currently established method of conducting an operational task or activity.

Note: Their purpose is to promote recognisable and measurable degrees of discipline, uniformity, consistency and commonality within an organization, with the aim of improving operational effectiveness and safety. SOPs should reflect local requirements and circumstances.

B.1.26
stockpile
in the context of SALW, the term refers to ….. a large accumulated stock of **weapons** and **EO**.

B.1.27
stockpile destruction
the physical activities and destructive procedures leading to a reduction of the national **stockpile**.

B.1.28
stockpile management
those procedures and activities regarding SALW safety and security in accounting, storage, transportation and handling.

B.1.29
theft resistant
construction designed to deter and/or delay illegal entry into facilities used for the storage of SALW.

B.1.30
tolerable risk
risk that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society. [ISO Guide 51: 1999 (E)]

B.1.31
transfer
the import, export, trans-shipment, re-export, intangible transfer, licensed movement during production, brokering and transport of SALW.

B.1.32
weapon
any thing used, designed or used or intended for use:[11]

a) in causing death or injury to any person; or

b) for the purposes of threatening or intimidating any person and without restricting the generality of the foregoing, includes a firearm.

B.1.33
workplace
all places where employees need to be or to go by reason of their work and which are under the direct or indirect control of the employer. [ILO R164]

[11] Criminal Code of Canada (CCofC) Section (S) 2 'Interpretation' Paragraph 2.